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# The Impact of Military Procurements on the Old Middle Classes in Japan, 1931–1941

EARL H. KINMONTH

## *Introduction*

This paper is part of a study of the impact of militarism-fascism in Japan on the various elements of the so-called middle classes.<sup>1</sup> It is ultimately concerned with the question of who supported those developments of the 1930s that ultimately culminated in Japanese involvement in a multi-front war against China, the US, and a host of other countries.

Although a long line of pre- and post-war assertion has connected the Japanese old middle class to the rise of militarism-fascism, little serious research on this alleged connection has been done.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, that which has been published is far from convincing. Patterns of behaviour to be found in non-fascist societies have been cited as proof that the old middle class was fascist in Japan. More important, it has never been demonstrated that the old middle class had any economic reason to support militarism-fascism in Japan, a curious failing of Japanese scholarship given its overwhelmingly Marxist colouring.

The research presented here proceeds from a simple assumption. A group or class that benefits or anticipates benefits from a particular political order will be more likely to support that order than when the benefits are neither realised nor anticipated. The conclusion of this study is that as a whole, the old middle class did not benefit and gave little indication of enthusiasm for militarism-fascism.

## *Manshū*

The first opportunity that Japanese of any social class had to see whether militarism-fascism was to their benefit came with the takeover of Manchuria by the *Kantōgun*. In the first few months after the invasion of Manchuria and the establishment of

Manchukuo, magazines aimed at least in part at the old middle class held out the promise of greatly expanded commercial opportunities.<sup>3</sup> This euphoria did not last long. As it turned out, Manchukuo presented few opportunities for small business. Although hoards of Japanese white-collar and skilled blue-collar workers were moving to Manchukuo, they were primarily employed by *Mantetsu* and government agencies. Both had extremely powerful consumer co-operatives that left almost no room for the independent merchant to operate.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, in the few consumption sectors not covered by co-operatives, competition from Chinese merchants who knew the terrain and who would accept lower margins left little for the small Japanese merchant.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, according to some accounts, it was said that Chinese merchants would sell goods at a loss, taking their profit from recycling the packaging materials. True or not, this claim is testimony to the degree to which Manchuria after the Kwantung Army takeover was perceived as a hostile environment for small merchants.

The Kwantung Army types who controlled Manchukuo and their home front supporters had something of a soft spot in their institutional hearts for peasants, but not for merchants.<sup>6</sup> While peasants were heavily subsidised in their moves to Manchukuo, almost from the founding of the puppet state,<sup>7</sup> programmes for small businessmen were not developed until 1939. Until relief for unemployed small businessmen became a domestic political issue in the late 1930s, small businessmen found it difficult to even gain entry to Manchuria, even at their own expense unless they were in certain favoured lines of business, principally highly specialised manufacturing and *mizu-shōbai* (inns, brothels, etc.). Complaints about this discriminatory treatment were sometimes answered by suggesting that merchants could move to Manchukuo by becoming peasants. Considering that even with heavy subsidies, peasants as peasants did not want to go to Manchukuo, it is hardly surprising that such proposals were greeted with some derision. Although Kwantung Army and Manchukuo government plans envisaged moving one million peasants, only one-third of this number was realised, and then only with considerable promotion, subsidy, and a high return rate.<sup>8</sup>

In the late 1930s it became virtually impossible for merchants and small businessmen to capitalise on the militarism–fascism that had produced Manchukuo. Controls on capital movement limited to ¥500 the amount that could be taken out of Japan. There were ways to get round this restriction, but its existence meant that the small businessman who would establish himself in Manchukuo had to break a number of laws to do so. In contrast, white-collar workers were being actively recruited by Manchukuo organisations such as *Mangyō* (Nissan) and the SMRR.<sup>9</sup>

Magazine articles aimed at small businessmen in this period exhibit a curious duality. Their authors generally accept the notion that Manchukuo is a ‘new heaven on earth’ (*shin-tenchi*) and therefore must offer greater opportunities.<sup>10</sup> This pattern is also to be found in guidebooks on movement to Manchuria. Looking only at the first few months of writing on Manchuria can easily leave the impression that it was indeed a ‘new heaven on earth’ for the small businessmen. Some Japanese scholars such as Eguchi Eiichi have seen the promise of Manchuria as diverting the old middle class from its domestic problems and leading them to accept

militarism-fascism.<sup>11</sup> Pursuing guide books and trade journals in the months after the founding of Manchuria shows that such a conclusion is premature.

When guides and magazines got down to the nitty gritty of actually moving to Manchuria and capitalising on its opportunities, they revealed that it was not in fact a land of opportunity for small business. Nowhere is this truer than in the pages of *Tairiku* (The Continent), a magazine published by Kaizō-sha, the publisher of *Kaizō* (The Reformation), a leading *interi*-oriented magazine. Each issue of this magazine carried hymns (sometimes literal songs) in praise of Manchukuo and consultation columns dealing with opportunities in the new heaven on earth. Invariably, questions from readers interested in retail or small manufacturing operations were answered in the negative. White-collar and skilled blue-collar opportunities were, however, available without limit.

The relative unimportance of militarism-fascism for small businessmen is seen in magazines and trade papers aimed at them. In these publications economic recovery and prosperity were explained almost entirely in terms of the export expansion that took place after the Yen was devalued as a consequence of Japan leaving the gold standard.<sup>12</sup> In contrast, student newspapers at *Tōdai*, *Kyōdai* and Waseda saw recovery and prosperity almost entirely in terms of the good market for functionaries in Manchuria and in the large companies riding on the Manchurian boom.<sup>13</sup>

To be sure, some segments of the old middle class received benefits from militarism in Manchuria, even if they did not participate directly in the Manchurian economy. The massive construction of the planned Manchurian economy brought orders to domestic Japanese firms. Spending on Manchuria helped to stimulate domestic industry, and some small firms benefited from this. The years after the establishment of Manchuria saw a substantial increase in the number of small firms in metal working and the heavy and chemical sectors.<sup>14</sup> Precisely how much of this increase is to be attributed to military expenditure (taken broadly to include the development of Manchuria) is not clear. At this point, the most that can be said is that general business magazines did not see small business as being a significant beneficiary of militarism, either in the narrow sense of military procurements, or in the broad sense of the Kwantung Army's creation of a new, non-capitalist 'heaven on earth' in Manchuria. General and specialist magazines did, however, explicitly relate the improving job market for university graduates to Manchuria.

The *Kantōgun* was strongly anti-capitalist, if not so strongly anti-capitalism. Its ideal for Manchurian development was state control of natural resources, and one state-controlled industry per sector.<sup>15</sup> The choice of which industries developed was not to be left to the market place but guided from above according to the imperatives of the *Kantōgun*. This meant essentially heavy and high technology industry geared to providing the *Kantōgun* with an independent economic base. In theory, only sectors essential to the public good were to be under the control of state monopolies or special corporations, with the rest of the economy left to free enterprise. The *Kantōgun* first, and later the economic bureaucrats who came from Japan, defined the sectors 'essential to the public good' so broadly that little was left for free enterprise small business other than petty trading, hotels, brothels and the like. If Manchuria

was a sample of the payoffs that might come from militarism-fascism, it was a sample that pointed explicitly to class benefits for the new middle class (the intelligentsia) but not the old.

### *China Incident*

After the outbreak of the so-called China Incident (1937), the situation for small business deteriorated rapidly. Unemployment, which had largely ceased to be a subject of newspaper concern after 1933–1934, returned with a vengeance in early 1938. Unlike the earlier period, when unemployment was associated with skilled blue collar workers and university students, the unemployment of this period was associated with small business and small businessmen, particularly small retailers and artisans. Their position declined so rapidly that by mid-1940 observers were using terms such as *ki no doku* (pathetic) to describe their situation. A combination of lost export markets, rationed or unobtainable raw materials, and labour lost to the munitions sector, combined to give what one commentator described as a ‘mortal blow’ (*chimeiteki dageki*) to large segments of small business.<sup>16</sup>

The actual scope of the unemployment suffered by the old middle class is impossible to determine. Japanese unemployment figures for these years are notoriously bad, seemingly intended to disguise policy failures while giving the pretence of concern. Estimates for 1938 range from 225,000 to 450,000.<sup>17</sup> The renovation bureaucrat Minoguchi Tokujirō thought the appropriate number to be in the order of 200,000.<sup>18</sup> Whatever the precise number, there is no question that unemployment among members of the old middle class was a striking phenomenon, all the more so since every other class or labour market segment was enjoying a seller’s market. Agriculture was desperately short of labour. College and university graduates were contracted months ahead of graduation. Companies were engaged in fierce competitive bidding for skilled workers.

The outbreak of large-scale warfare in China impacted on small business in a variety of ways. For some it meant a loss of export markets as fighting disrupted distribution or Chinese boycotted Japanese goods,<sup>19</sup> although the largest loss of export markets was still in the future, to come after the signing of the Tripartite Pact. For most, the initial impact of the China Incident was felt most directly in terms of a shortage of raw materials and goods.

In the third quarter of 1937 the ‘Law Concerning Temporary Measures for Imported Goods’ placed restrictions on the import of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, cotton, wool, leather, light and heavy oil, rubber, etc.<sup>20</sup> In the first and second quarters of 1938, various commodities were rationed. In August 1938 a Raw Material Mobilisation Plan drawn up by the *Kikakuin* in late 1937 was activated. The goal of the rationing and allocation of foreign exchange was to provide a maximum of materials for the war machine. Small businesses that were not linked to that machine were in effect starved of supplies. The Welfare Ministry estimated that activation of the Raw Material Mobilisation Plan generated 390,000 unemployed.<sup>21</sup>

As contemporary accounts observed, this unemployment was quite different from

that which had been experienced in the past. It was not distributed over the whole range of industries and employment. It was concentrated in small-scale, even tiny firms, in traditional and consumer-oriented areas. Moreover, it included a very large number of proprietors.<sup>22</sup> It was not the unemployment of prime age males as had been the case with the unemployment of the 1920s. Young men and young women were being snapped up, indeed virtually fought over, by firms that cashed in on the military boom. Those who were unemployed were predominantly too old or otherwise unattractive to the booming sectors of the economy.

Indeed, while small and traditional businesses were suffering from unemployment, they also suffered from a labour shortage. Young workers in these establishments were leaving in large numbers for the more attractive pay and working conditions of larger firms, especially those in the munitions sector.<sup>23</sup> A survey done in this period of the problems faced by small business found their second greatest problem after the direct impact of controls and rationing to be that of finding staff.<sup>24</sup>

The situation for a large segment of small business worsened when government policy moved from prohibiting unlinked imports of certain commodities to prohibiting the manufacture of products that used certain raw materials. These prohibitions were introduced without any countervailing policy to absorb those who had their livelihood destroyed. In the early stages, the central government relied on exhortation, calling on the munitions industry to absorb the unemployed.<sup>25</sup> This call went largely unheeded as the munitions industry had already hired those who were attractive to it. Some local governments tried to respond. In 1938 the Tokyo prefectural government had to set aside ¥400,000 for aid to small shop operators who had been hit by luxury and other restrictions. Those in special trouble included copper, brass, nickel workers, those using precious metals, trinket makers, hide finishers, etc.<sup>26</sup> Considering the numbers, the amount appears to have been grossly inadequate.

When the so-called '7.7 stop order' (*7.7 kinrei*) on luxury goods was issued in July 1940, the quasi-governmental think tank *Kokusaku kenkyūjo* surveyed the impact on small business in various parts of the country. While it did find some regional variation, it described the general situation as 'wretched' (*santan*) and 'on the brink of death' (*hinshi*).<sup>27</sup> Traditional craftsmen who produced goods defined as luxuries were especially hard hit. The Nishijin weavers of Kyōto are a case in point. They had already been harmed by restrictions on the use of gold and silver. With the '7.7 stop order', they were effectively forced out of business. According to one study, only twenty per cent were able to find an alternative to their weaving of luxury *kimono* accessories. Most had no skills, capital or buildings that could be turned to some form of production in the favoured or permitted areas.<sup>28</sup>

In some cases, the situation was made even worse by the bureaucratic turf struggles and lack of co-ordination that were so evident in Japan's prosecution of the war with the US. The *7.7 kinrei* prohibited the sale of furs costing over ¥200, although the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry had been encouraging the production of silver fox pelts as a relief measure for farmers in Hokaidō.<sup>29</sup> Farmers were left with hungry foxes and no market for them. Furriers were left without supplies.

The situation for small business became so grim that the Cabinet Information Board gave orders that 'the difficulties of unemployment and occupational change from small and medium-size commercial and industrial firms' was subject to censorship.<sup>30</sup> This testified to a high level of concern, if not with the actual plight of small business, then with possible discontent arising in this sector. Otherwise, with the exception of overt military issues, economic and business news was relatively freely reported, even in 1941.

This concern was doubtless heightened by a further decline in the position of the old middle class brought about by the September 1940 Tripartite Pact among Italy–Germany–Japan. By associating itself with the Axis, Japan invited the abrogation of the trade agreements between itself and the USA. With the cessation of trade and the US embargo on scrap exports, the impact of militarism-fascism hit a wider spectrum of the old middle class. Export markets outside the yen block virtually disappeared. The ending of scrap and petroleum imports from the US hit even those small concerns that were involved in war production.<sup>31</sup> This gave the economic bureaucrats yet another reason for extending controls (*tōsei*) and extending them in a way that worked to the detriment of small business. Naive, conventional interpretations of Japanese history often speak of a military takeover in these years, but if there was any takeover, it was by economic bureaucrats.

### *Government Policy*

Prior to 1937, the government was only moderately involved in the economy, and not terribly concerned with small business, positively or negatively. There was a certain amount of standard setting and the promotion of generally ineffective cartels in an attempt to control allegedly excessive competition in this or that industry.<sup>32</sup> The real push for power by economic bureaucrats did not come until the 1934 struggle over control of the electric power industry. This ended in only a partial victory for the bureaucrats. The transmission system was nationalised, but generating and retailing electricity remained private.<sup>33</sup>

With big targets like the electric industry to go after, economic bureaucrats appear to have paid little attention to small business. Policy, such as it existed, appears to have been rather *ad hoc* and involved a mix of goals including regional development, relief and supplementary production to help firms fill their orders for Manchurian development.<sup>34</sup> Some effort was made to plug small manufacturers into a well-defined sub-contracting network, but the results appear to have been limited. Large firms did not want to be bothered, feared quality control problems, or already had their own networks.<sup>35</sup> Government arsenals in particular were unenthusiastic, being used to producing entirely in-house or purchasing complete units from outside. They were not geared up to deal with a myriad of small suppliers, most with limited technology and managerial skills.<sup>36</sup>

The activation of the Revised Plan for Mobilisation of Raw Materials, forced the government to be concerned with the shift of small firms to areas where raw materials were available. A particular push was made to incorporate small firms further into sub-contracting networks. Indeed, this was the only way some small firms could

have any hope of obtaining raw materials. Where firms could not be shifted to military production, they were encouraged to move into substitute (*daiyōhin*) production such as the notorious *sofu* (staple fibre) used to make clothing that disintegrated after a few washes.<sup>37</sup>

Without a wide survey of relevant trade publications, it is difficult to judge how successful these efforts were. One generally upbeat government-sponsored publication talked of a 'large measure of accomplishment' but went on to observe that 'as a result of various factors, things did not go as smoothly as originally anticipated'.<sup>38</sup> Given the tendency to self-promotion in the reports of any government, particularly the Japanese government of this period, it is probably reasonable to assume 'not as smoothly as originally anticipated' may be read as thoroughly bolloxed up. Such performance would be in keeping with other aspects of bureaucratic management in this period where, in the Kansai, firms were bringing suit over the erratic supply of electricity that had resulted after it had come under government control.<sup>39</sup> Failures were attributed to: a) a limited number of fields still having raw materials; b) the difficulty that small firms encountered in acquiring new technology or skills; c) their shortage of capital for new equipment.<sup>40</sup>

For better or worse this stage did not last long enough for its policies to be really tested. Some aspects are intriguing because they suggest post-war patterns. Most notably there appear to have been some efforts made to organise small firms into well-defined networks where they served one and only one firm as a sub-contractor. Bureaucratic accounts of policy show great concern that small firms should not be 'freelancing' (serving more than one 'parent' company).<sup>41</sup> At the same time, the 'parent' companies were supposed to be explicitly involved in upgrading the technology of their 'children'. Writers on this subject were particularly concerned with breaking the power of the jobbers (*tonya, toiya*), who had traditionally controlled sub-contracting networks in Japan.<sup>42</sup>

Economic bureaucrats really came into their own with the Tripartite Pact of September 1940. When the US reacted by terminating commercial treaties and ceasing exports of scrap and petroleum, economic bureaucrats gained yet another excuse for more control (*tōsei*) over the economy in general and over small business in particular. Under the guise of pursuing the utmost efficiency of allocation (*kyōkyūdo no kō-nōritsu jūten shugi*), economic bureaucrats largely dropped any pretence of trying to help small firms survive in new lines of business and turned instead to an overt policy of driving them out of existence.

Some publications went so far as to proclaim that, like it or not, proprietors (*jigyō-nushi*) would have to accept being turned into ordinary labourers (*rōdōsha*).<sup>43</sup> Proclaiming the present day 'an age when the state will seek to consciously balance overall supply and demand', small business had to expect that a sorting out (*seibi*) was inevitable.<sup>44</sup> For textiles, the pre-eminent small business sector of pre-war Japan, this 'sorting out' would eventually involve the physical destruction of much of the industry, not by US bombers, but by Japanese economic bureaucrats. Three waves of 'consolidation' (November 1940, August 1941, January 1943) reduced the productive capability of the industry to 30–50 per cent (depending on product) of its



pre-war peak. In the final stage, equipment was requisitioned and melted down as scrap.<sup>45</sup>

### *Kakushin kanryō*

The measures taken against small business were not driven solely by wartime imperatives. The intellectual background and class conceits on the part of top-level bureaucrats had a significant role in the basically negative approach taken to small business. The top-level economic bureaucrats of this time were generally known as *kakushin kanryō* or renovationist bureaucrats. They, and their academic mentors in the Imperial universities, were at best indifferent to small business, and at worst overtly hostile. This segment of what Maruyama Masao has called the 'true intelligentsia' in Japan was marked by a heavily Marxist-influenced vision of a centrally-controlled state based on large-scale heavy industry.<sup>46</sup> In this vision, small business had at most a marginal and declining role. Contemporary observers noted that there were some who went so far as to call for the elimination of the merchant class (*zenmenteki ni haijo*).<sup>47</sup>

So strong was the perceived hostility toward small business that on assuming office in January 1940, Minister of Commerce and Industry, Fujihara Ginjirō was moved to make an explicit statement that he disagreed with the 'prevailing bureaucratic attitude' that small business 'ought to be destroyed'.<sup>48</sup> This view was not, however, held by Kishi Nobusuke, one of the most widely noted and powerful of the renovationist bureaucrats. On taking office in May 1942, he declared: 'Manufacturers without whom the nation can do very well must be reduced in number so that labour can be directed to other undertakings'.<sup>49</sup>

Renovationist bureaucrats scored the excessive numbers of old middle class and their low technical standards. They could see only improved economic efficiency if a large portion of the old middle class was obliterated. A report issued by the *Shōwa kenkyūkai*, a veritable club for renovationist academics, welcomed the crisis that was besetting the old middle class, seeing it as a good chance to 'clean up (*seibi*) 'undisciplined and inefficient labour' and to develop Japanese industry in a 'healthy' direction, presumably Stalinistic gigantism and heavy industry. Noting that sacrifices would have to be made, members of the old middle class were told to take comfort that their sacrifice 'would be a most honourable one'.<sup>50</sup>

Certainly there was an element of fact behind these criticisms of the old middle class. Nevertheless, much of the criticism reflects, I believe, the class conceits of the intelligentsia. Finding any culture where the old middle class has been celebrated by any significant portion of the intelligentsia is most unlikely, but the attitudes that account for this were especially strong on the part of renovationist *interi*.

Renovationist bureaucrats and academics almost without exception had no scientific or technical training. Even those who concerned themselves directly with questions of efficiency in medium or high technology industries came to their concerns with a background in law or economics, not science or engineering.<sup>51</sup> Their notion of 'efficiency' seems to have been dominated by the notion of 'economy of scale'.

Writings by such bureaucrats and academics show no awareness that technological change had altered the formula 'bigger is more efficient'. In particular, there is no awareness that while steam or water power may have supported a 'bigger or more concentrated is most efficient' formula, that was not necessarily true of infinitely divisible electric power.

Thus the writings of the renovationist bureaucrats and intellectuals stand in sharp contrast with those of Okochi Masatoshi, *Tōdai*-trained engineer and founder of the *Rikagaku kenkyūjo*. He recognised that rural electrification permitted highly dispersed production, and by utilising inexpensive rural labour operating specialised equipment, some high technology products could be more efficiently produced by decreasing scale, not increasing it.<sup>52</sup>

Writings by renovationist bureaucrats and intellectuals paid only scant attention to diseconomies of scale. Even when the production of a single product may be more efficient with increased scale, the organisation required to support that scale may be less efficient overall than an aggregation of small, nominally less efficient producers. Large-scale operations are less flexible and mistakes are more costly whether in terms of production or factory design. Perhaps more importantly, large-scale organisations have more overhead, more places for deadwood to hide, and tend towards an edifice complex that results in large expenditures on showy headquarters and other facilities not directly related to production. Although it is possible to find occasional reference to these issues, it is clear that 'renovationist bureaucrats' and intellectuals did not want to dwell on these problems.<sup>53</sup> Large organisations were ultimately preferable to small. One element behind this perception may have been class interest.

*Amakudari* had begun to attract press comment in the late 1930s. Presumably the pattern had begun somewhat earlier. Small firms were inherently unattractive as resting places for descending bureaucrats, if for no other reason than their very smallness. They could not provide the status, to say nothing of income and perks, that bureaucrats thought themselves entitled. Even among medium-scale firms that might have provided just enough status for descending bureaucrats, there was a strong tradition of anti-bureaucratism, especially in textiles, which had grown up almost entirely without government support or supervision.<sup>54</sup> Regulated and cartelised small business did, however, provide *amakudari* slots, if not in the small firms as such, then in the supervisory and regulatory associations, particularly as these had to operate with governmental blessing.

Marxism was very much an element of the renovationist bureaucrats' intellectual baggage. Those within and without the government calling for a controlled (*tōsei*) or even planned (*keikaku*) economy were, with rare exceptions, products of Tokyo University in the years just after World War I, when Marxism first put its headlock on the Japanese intelligentsia.<sup>55</sup> Marx himself had had little to say on the 'old middle class', and all of that had been negative, including the notion that the 'old middle class' was destined to wither away or be absorbed into the working class.<sup>56</sup> This notion was completely in accord with the renovationist bureaucrats' notion that the 'old middle class' was a relic of the past and should be absorbed into the general labour force for the promotion of heavy industry.<sup>57</sup> As Eguchi Eiichi has pointed out,

other Marxist writers known in Japan had elaborated little on the treatment of the 'old middle class' in Marx himself and Japanese had not ventured beyond the imported gospel.<sup>58</sup>

Although Marxist formulae could not be expressed openly in the late 1930s, they are readily detectable in renovationist bureaucrats' and intellectual writing. The age of *laissez faire* (read bourgeoisie) is declared to be passing away to be replaced by the age of controls (*tōsei*) and planning (*keikaku*) (read socialism). With the passing of *laissez faire*, the 'old middle class' is at best an anachronism and at worst a brake on industrial efficiency and planning.

The feeling that they were riding the wave of the future was very much a part of the intellectual conceits held by renovationist bureaucrats and intellectuals. One of their many justifications for the controlled or planned economy was that it was the wave of the future, as demonstrated by Italy, Germany, the USSR under Stalin, even by the American New Deal.<sup>59</sup> Closer to home, there was the apparent success of Manchuria with its policy of state control over resources and one heavily controlled firm per major industry. *Laissez faire* (*gyū hōnin shugi*) had had its day.<sup>60</sup> Following the same line of reasoning, small business was an anachronism, or as one researcher proclaimed *ichijirushiku kyū-seidō-teki*, and an impediment (*jama mono*) on the road to developing a modern economy based on heavy and high precision industry.<sup>61</sup> Other spokesmen for the new order advised small businessmen not to direct their complaints at it but to recognise that their problems were of their own doing because they were out of step with 'progress'.<sup>62</sup>

Renovationist bureaucrats who were generally in favour of concentration could find a role for small manufacturers in niche markets and in areas where economies of scale did not apply (relatively few in their estimation). The same renovationist bureaucrats could not find even this limited role for what they perceived as a gross excess of merchants. A few merchants were needed to operate the rationing system, but beyond that, merchants were generally perceived only as a labour pool that ought to be doing something else. The retail sector in particular was criticised for its extravagant use of labour, as much as could be found.<sup>63</sup> Attacks on merchants ranged from the somewhat reasoned criticisms of a technocrat like Minoguchi to stump speeches by STS supporters who talked repeatedly of confectionaries and *tofu* makers who worked only a few hours a day and spent the rest of their time fishing – when they should be working in plants producing for the war effort.<sup>64</sup>

### *Who Supported Fascism?*

In one of the three famous essays on Japanese nationalism that established his reputation,<sup>65</sup> Maruyama Masao located the social basis of Japanese fascism in the lower middle class:

Roughly speaking, we can say that the middle strata provided the social support for the fascist movement in Japan as well [as Germany]. But in the case of Japan a more elaborate analysis is necessary. The middle of petty *bourgeois* stratum in

Japan can be divided into the following two types: first, the social class that comprises small factory owners, building contractors, proprietors of retail shops, master carpenters, small landowners, independent farmers, school teachers (especially in primary schools), employees of village offices, low-grade officials, Buddhist and Shinto priests; Secondly, persons like urban salaried employees, so-called men of culture, journalists, men in occupations demanding higher knowledge such as professors and lawyers, and university and college students.

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It was the former group (the 'old middle class' as used here) that provided the 'social foundation of fascism' while those with 'higher knowledge' were passively resistant, and not positive advocates of fascism.<sup>67</sup> This formula subsequently became accepted wisdom (*teisetsu*) and has never been seriously questioned by historians, Japanese or foreign.

Maruyama himself offered not a single example of 'old middle class' support for fascism. His writings were focused entirely on élites. Japanese critics have noted that Maruyama appears to have based his generalisation about the 'old middle class' entirely on his limited military experience.<sup>68</sup> He specifically equates his first category of middle class with the role 'played by non-commissioned officers in the Army'.<sup>69</sup> One can only begin to imagine the psychological trauma experienced by a *Tōdai* faculty member having to take orders from his educational and social inferiors.

The only major work to test explicitly the notion of the 'old middle class' as a locus of Japanese fascist values, could not find anything other than bourgeoisie-reformist demands in the platforms of a number of late 1920s and early 1930s political movements based in the 'old middle class'.<sup>70</sup> Other studies that have purported to find 'fascism' in the 'old middle class' have in fact found jingoism (*haigai shugi*) and movements to support soldiers serving overseas (*imon undō*).<sup>71</sup> These phenomena are hardly peculiar to fascism or fascist states. If anything, the rhetoric of Japanese jingoism was rather muted compared to that characterising modern British tabloids in a society that one could hardly style fascist. More important, these 'old middle class' movements did not pick up on those aspects of European fascism that attracted renovationist intellectuals and bureaucrats: the planned economy run by experts, the corporatist state organised along occupational lines (*shokunō dantai*), the denial of parliamentary government, industrial gigantism, etc.

Key elements of what Japanese loosely refer to as 'military fascism' clearly had no appeal to the 'old middle class'. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and the notion of building a new order in Asia were intellectual constructs hatched by the élite intellectuals who staffed such think tanks as the *Shōwa kenkyūkai*.<sup>72</sup> Although the stuff of articles in *interi*-oriented publications such as *Kaizō* and *Chūō Kōron*, these grandiose notions received little or no attention in trade magazines and newspapers where the concern was the bottom line, not racial liberation. These lofty goals had been denounced as bunkum by Saitō Takao in a Diet speech that explicitly questioned whether the payoff from Japanese operations in China was sufficient to justify the cost.

Renovationist bureaucrats writing to the old middle class clearly saw themselves as

having to sell an unpopular set of ideas to a class that generally saw little profit in any of the developments associated with the various 'new orders' of the late 1930s. When a renovationist bureaucrat such as Minoguchi Tokujirō called on the old middle class to accept a struggle that was not to require one or two years, not even decades, but perhaps centuries,<sup>73</sup> he was asking the old middle class to accept a vision in which his class was ascending while theirs was to be forced out of existence by the likes of Minoguchi if the laws of historical inevitability did not act fast enough.

### *Hōkoku undō*

As with the blue collar labour, the government sponsored a *hōkoku undō* for the small business sector. The blue collar version represented substantial recognition (albeit in the form of attempted co-option) for labour and incorporated many figures and some slogans from the labour movement. The *Shōgyō hōkoku undō* was, however, far more clearly bureaucratic in origin and out of touch with past political currents in the small business sector. The main points of its platform were:

- a) serving the Emperor through our occupation;
- b) conducting trade on the basis of giving priority to public profit (*kōeki yūsen*);
- c) aiming for the construction of a new economic order.<sup>74</sup>

Calls for a new economic order had never been part of the programmes of political movements associated with small business.<sup>75</sup> New orders, economic, political or otherwise, were products of renovationist bureaucrats and left-wing academics. The notion that in a sellers' market any significant number of small businessmen would be putting public gain ahead of private profit must have appeared at least faintly absurd to even those who drafted the programme.<sup>76</sup> This was particularly the case since the phrase *kōeki yūsen* was very much part of the vocabulary of those who proclaimed that small business was an anachronism, destined to be swept aside as Japan moved to a planned economy based on heavy industry and precision machinery.<sup>77</sup>

The small business analogue to the *Sangyō hōkoku undō* seems to have generated little enthusiasm. It was criticised as being little more than a spiritual or morale-boosting movement (*seishin undō*) and admitted even by its proponents as being incapable of handling the main problem faced by small business, that of being driven out of business by restrictions and shortages.<sup>78</sup> Hearing exhortations such as

But it is sincerely to be hoped that all of them will display the same spirit of devotion to the State as officers and men of the front and assume their new occupations gladly . . .

could not compensate for loss of livelihood or a forced switch to a new, unfamiliar and unattractive occupation. Ultimately, the old middle class was the only class that did not gain as a class under militarism-fascism.

In one sense, the old middle class can be regarded as the only class to have worked consistently to subvert the goals of Japanese fascism and Japanese fascists. It did this through continual violation of the many control edicts and regulations covering the distribution and sale price of goods. Under a regime that was explicitly oriented to

central planning and control and which had as a formal goal 'the primacy of public (state) profit' (*kōeki yūsen*), small business, especially small traders, continued to follow market principles, charging as much as they could, shifting goods not according to bureaucratic fiat but according to demand and ability to pay.

This opposition to fascism has gone entirely unrecognised by Japanese historians. While there are detailed, one might, almost say 'loving', histories of intellectual repression in Japan, there is little of economic repression. The Special Higher Police (*tokkō*) who oppressed the intelligentsia are well-known, but little is said of the Economic Police (*keizai keisatsu*) who oppressed the old middle class. The heroes of post-war histories are the unrepentant communists who languished in jail throughout these years or the few academics or writers who occasionally published something offensive to the régime or who were caught up in the red hysteria of the *Kikakuin* or Yokohama incidents. Nevertheless, when it is considered that those who fell foul of the 'fascist regime' looked to the Soviet Union under Stalin as their model, it is highly questionable whether they represented opposition to fascism, or whether they were in fact fascists of a different persuasion.

In the sense that they represented the anarchy of the market-place and the primacy of private profit over state goals, whether determined by a nominally fascist or nominally socialist régime, the old middle class and its violation of government edicts and controls was much more of an alternative than anything the Japanese left, in or out of jail, had to offer.

## Conclusion

Some elements of the relative cost and benefit distribution resulting from militarism-fascism seem quite clear even at this stage of research. Some groups (classes) in Japan did benefit unequivocally from militarism-fascism, specifically the intelligentsia, especially the higher civil service,<sup>79</sup> and skilled blue collar workers. Tenant farmers experienced a *de facto* land reform as a result of government policy to fix rents while paying production bonuses scaled to inflation. Conversely, landlords saw their position substantially eroded by militarism-fascism.

Some elements of the old middle class also benefited, those with the technical skills that enabled them to find a niche within the military-oriented economy that emerged in the late 1930s. Very large segments, however, did not benefit. Moreover, they were not seen as particularly enthusiastic about the direction the Japanese state was taking in 1940–41.<sup>80</sup> If this state was indeed fascist, as most Japanese histories, particularly those written from a Marxist perspective, would have it, the evidence presented here cannot but call into question at least two major elements of conventional (leftist) wisdom on this period: (a) that the social basis of Japanese militarism-fascism was the old middle class; and (b) that categories as broadly defined as the old middle class (or the proletariat, or capitalists) are useful for understanding phenomena such as fascism.<sup>81</sup>

Nevertheless, despite compelling evidence that the old middle class was not a major beneficiary or supporter of militarism-fascism in Japan, one cannot expect that

reality to be accepted by Japanese scholars, at least by that portion controlled by the headlock or Marxist dogma.<sup>82</sup> This is amusingly demonstrated by Nakamura Masanori, a major Marxist economic historian. In the preface to a volume on 'War and State Monopoly Capitalism', edited by Nakamura himself, he blithely declares the old middle class to have been the social basis of Japanese fascism, even as the one and only article in the collection that specifically deals with the old middle class demonstrates in great detail how the old middle class was continually attacked by the régime it allegedly supported.<sup>83</sup> A serious application of the concept of class interest to Japan of the 1930s cannot but show that the prime beneficiaries of militarism-fascism were Marxist-influenced members of the true intelligentsia and that militarism-fascism shared many of the goals of contemporary Marxism.

#### Notes

1. Militarism-fascism is used as an English equivalent of the Japanese *gun-fuashoshugi*. Old middle class is used as an equivalent of the Japanese *puchi-buro*. Use of these categories is not an endorsement of their analytical utility. Indeed, one point of this paper is to show that under serious, non-dogmatic scrutiny, these concepts disintegrate. At the same time, one goal of this paper is to show that using these categories one can come to very different conclusions simply by being more rigorous and inclusive in terms of sources than is the norm in Japan.
2. The most eloquent statement of this alleged connection is found in Maruyama Masao, *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics*, ed. Ivan Morris. New York, Oxford University Press, 1969/1963, pp. 57–58. Maruyama does not, however, offer any solid evidence for this claim.
3. The promises of guide books are noted in Eguchi Keiichi, *Toshi shōburujōa undō shi no kenkyū*. Miraisha, 1976, p. 451. An example in English may be found in Uenoda Setsu, 'Ways of Bandits in Manchuria Described by Japanese Visitor'. *Trans-Pacific*, 10 May 1934, pp. 5–6. The bandits referred to in the title are not, as some might imagine, Japanese businessmen, but rather Manchurian 'freedom' fighters.
4. The enormous breadth and scope of the SMRR co-op is described in 'The S.M.R. Co-operative Society', *Contemporary Manchuria* 2/6, November 1938, pp. 105–114. As this article notes, the SMRR co-op was only the largest of many operating in Manchuria.
5. Obama Toshie, *Kane yori mono e* ('From Money to Material'). Chikura shobō, 1933, pp. 180–183.
6. For some of the romantic rhetoric associated with emigration, see 'The Immigration of Japanese Farmers to Manchukuo: Its Necessity and Chances of Success', *Contemporary Manchuria*, November 1937, pp. 1–28.
7. The subsidy programmes are described in Matsumura Takao, 'Manshūkoku seiritsu ikō ni okeru imin – rōdō seisaku no keisei to tenkai', in *Nihon teikoku shugi shita no Manshū*, ed. Manshū shi kenkyūkai. Ochanomizu shobō, 1972, p. 253.
8. For data on the movement of peasants to Manchuria, see *ibid.*, p. 257.
9. Among the many articles on this subject, I used the following: 'Manshū ni yūhi sen to suru', *Jitsugyō no Nihon*, 1 January 1933, pp. 122–125; 'Shūshokunan wa satta', *Gendai* 38/3, March 1938, pp. 166–173; 'Tairiku shokugyō annai', *Jitsugyō no Sekai*, August 1838, pp. 122–124; Kuramoto Chōji, 'Kōuri akinai no tairiku shinshutsu', *Shōtenkai*, July 1939, pp. 2–11; 'Chūshō kigyō', *Ekonomisuto*, 16 June 1941; 1 October 1939, pp. 46–48; 'Manshū e shōgyō imin', *Shōtenkai*, January 1940, pp. 37–41; 'Chūshō kigyō no genjō', *Ekonomisuto*, 10 June 1940, pp. 77–124; 'Manshūkoku shinshutsu shōnin no jitsujō o kataru', *Jitsugyō no Nihon* 43/6, 15 March 1941, pp. 63–69; 'Tengyō to Manshū', *Shōtenkai*, August 1941, pp. 76–79.
10. Strictly speaking, the term *shin-tenchi* means 'new arena for action' or 'new realm' or 'frontier'. My translation is based on the use of the word in the context of creating a new order that would not only

transcend the problems of contemporary Japan but which would also be a model for the rest of the world.

11. Eguchi Keiichi, *Toshi shōburujōa undō shi no kenkyū*, p. 451.
12. This pattern appears in all economic coverage of the period including journals such as *Shōtenkai* (Retail World), *Jitsugyō no Nihon* (Business Japan), *Tōyō keizai shinpō* (Oriental Economist), etc. For a brief description of the trade recovery, see Arisawa Hiromi, *Shōwa keizai shi*. Nihon Keizai Shinbun-sha, 1976, pp. 90–93.
13. This phenomenon is noted in Earl H. Kinmonth, *The Self-Made Man in Meiji Japanese Thought: From Samurai To Salaryman*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1981. pp. 307–308.
14. Koyama Hirotake, *Nihon gunji kōgyō no shiteki bunseki*. Ochanomizu shobō, 1972, pp. 270–271. Miyazaki Masayasu and Itō Osamu, ‘Senji – sengo no sangyō to kigyō’, in ‘*Keikakuka*’ to ‘*Minshuka*’, ed. Nakamura Takafusa. Iwanami shoten, 1989, pp. 212–213.
15. For the anti-capitalist rhetoric of the *Kantōgun* in English, see, ‘Principles of Economic Construction,’ *Manchukuo Today*, 1940.
16. Mori Ki’ichi, *Saihensei katei no Nihon chūshō sangyō*. Nyūgen-sha, 1941, pp. 38–39.
17. Minoguchi Tokijirō, *Chūshō sangyō to rōmu mondai*. Tokyo, Nihon Shuppan-sha, 1943, p. 12, notes a *Kikakuin* estimate of 225,000; Yui, *Chūshō Kigyō Seisaku*, pp. 329 and 332 cites the *Kikakuin* for a figure of 450,000 and the *Kōseishō* for a figures of 370,000. Mori Ki’ichi, *Saihensei katei no Nihon chūshō sangyō*, pp. 42–43, expresses some scepticism about otherwise unidentified estimates in the 320–370,000 range.
18. Minoguchi Tokijirō, *Chūshō sangyō to rōmu mondai*, p. 37.
19. Yui, *Chūshō kigyō seisaku*, p. 322.
20. Toyoda Masataka, *Sangyō kokusaku to chūshō sangyō*. Sangyō keizai gakkai, 1941, p. 9.
21. Shiota Sakiko, ‘Senji tōsei keizai shita no chūshō shōkōgyōsha’, in *Sensō to kokka dokusen shihon shugi*, ed. Nakamura Masanori. Nihon hyōron-sha, 1979, p. 228.
22. Mori, *Saihensei*, p. 43; Yui, *Chūshō kigyō seisaku*, p. 332.
23. ‘Shōten’in fusoku’, *Shōtenkai*, November 1939, pp. 38–54; ‘Chūshō kogyō’, *Ekonomisuto*, 16 June 1941, pp. 24–27; Shōwa kenkyū kai, *Rōdōshintaisei kenkyū*. Tōyō keizai shinpō-sha, 1941, p. 283; Inoue Tei’zō, *Ten’in no taigu to kyōiku*. Dōbunkan, 1941, pp. 26–27; Minoguchi, *Chūshō sangyō*, p. 145; ‘Chūshō shogyōsha wa dō naru; Chūshō kōgyō wa dō naru’, *Jitsugyō no Nihon*, 1 January 1940, pp. 166–169.
24. Toyoda, *Sangyō kokusaku*, pp. 49–50.
25. ‘Forced Hiring of Jobless to Offset Unemployment’, *Trans-Pacific*, 25 August 1938, p. 11.
26. ‘City Will Assist Hard-hit Workers’, *ibid.*, 23 February, p. 16.
27. Yatsugi Kazuo, *Shōwa dōran shi*. Keizei ōrai-sha, 1963, p. 2:318.
28. Shiota, ‘Senji tōsei’, p. 253.
29. ‘Fur Business Hit By Ban On Luxuries’, *Trans-Pacific*, 18 July 1940, p. 19.
30. Gregory J. Kasza, *The State and the Mass Media in Japan, 1918–1945*. University of California Press, 1988, p. 179.
31. Toyoda Masataka, *Sangyō kokusaku to chūshō sangyō*, pp. 11–12.
32. Matsushima Harumi, ‘Senji keizai taisei no seiritsu katei to sangyō seikaku’, in *Nihon keizei seisaku shiron*, ed. Andō Yoshio. Tokyo daigaku shuppan-kai, 1976, p. 102.
33. For a general description of this struggle between renovation bureaucrats and the power industry, see Matsushima Harumi, ‘Senji keizai taisei no seiritsu katei to sangyō seisaku’, pp. 97–186. For the charged rhetoric of the time (‘fascist’, ‘socialist’, etc.), see ‘Socialism Charged In Official Scheme’, *Trans-Pacific*, 6 August 1936, p. 24; ‘Big Business Heads Flay Control Plan’, *ibid.*, 24 September 1936, p. 22.
34. Yui, *Chūshō kigyō seisaku*, pp. 251–252.



35. *Ibid.*, p. 317.
36. Mori, *Saihensei*, p. 40.
37. On *sofu* and other substitutes, see 'Bureaucratic Mismanagement Said Cause of Increasingly Serious Power Shortage,' *Trans-Pacific*, 14 September 1939, p. 19; 'Japanese Victory Over "Sofu" Hailed', *Trans-Pacific*, 29 February 1940, p. 21. On the difficulties of conversion, see Miyazaki, 'Senji-sengo,' p. 175; Yui, *Chūshō kigyō seisaku*, p. 330.
38. Toyoda Masataka, *Sangyō kokusaku to chūshō sangyō*, p. 131.
39. 'Bureaucratic Mismanagement Said Cause of Increasingly Serious Power Shortage', p. 19; Hori Makiyo, 'Denryoku kokka kanri no shisō to seisaku', in *Hōkai ki no kenkyū*, ed. Fuashizumu kenkyū bukai Waseda daigaku shakai kagaku kenkyūjo. Waseda daigaku shuppan-bu, 1978, p. 135.
40. Toyoda Masataka, *Sangyō kokusaku to chūshō sangyō*, p. 132.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 18–19.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 133.
45. Miyazaki Masayasu; Itō Osamu, 'Senji – sengo no sangyō to kigyō', pp. 176–179.
46. Using the categories defined by Maruyama Masao, the *kakushin kanryō*, who were, with very rare exceptions *Tōdai*-educated higher civil servants (*kōtōkan*), belong to the category of the 'true intelligentsia'. See Maryuama, *Thought and Behaviour*, pp. 57–58. It must be noted that Maruyama himself does not mention the *kakushin kanryō* in this context. To do so would make his assertions that the true *interi* were not positive advocates of fascism instantly and completely ludicrous.
47. Tōkyō shōkō kaigisho, *Rinsen taisei ka no shōgyōsha mondai*, ed. Funada Chū. Dai-Nippon shuppan, 1941, p. 30 (*horī*).
48. 'Fujihara Will Aid Small Industries', *Trans-Pacific*, 25 January 1940, p. 21.
49. This statement is quoted in Thomas A. Bisson, *Japan's War Economy*. IPR, 1945, pp. 80–82; and Jerome B. Cohen, *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction*. University of Minnesota Press, 1949, p. 100.
50. Shōwa kenkyū kai, *Rōdōshintaisei kenkyū*. Tōyō keizei shinpō-sha, 1941, p. 293.
51. On the educational background of *kakushin kanryō* and the term itself, see Hashikawa Bunzō, 'Kakushin kanryō', *Gendai no esupuri* 185, December 1982, pp. 94–103; Furukawa Takahisa, 'Kokka sōdōin hō o meguru seiji katei', *Nihon rekishi* 469, June 1987, pp. 63–80; Chalmers A. Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975*. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1982.
52. Okochi publicised this idea tirelessly in works such as Kuribayashi Toshiro, *Kagaku no kyōjin Okochi Masatoshi*. Tokyo, Tōkai Shuppan-sha, 1939; Okochi Masatoshi, *Kōgyō keiei sōron*. Chikura shobō, 1941/1936; Okochi Masatoshi, *Moteru kuni Nihon*. Kagaku shugi kōgyō sha, 1939; Okochi Masatoshi, *Seisan dai-ichi shugi*. Tokyo, Kagakushugi kōgyō-sha, 1941; Okochi Masatoshi, *Shihon shugi kogyō to kagaku shugi kōgyō*. Kagaku shugi kōgyō-sha, 1938; Okochi Masatoshi, *Tōsei keizai to keizai sen*. Kagaku shugi kōgyō-sha, 1940.
53. Toyoda, *Sangyō kokusaku*, p. 18.
54. On this aspect of small business, especially Kansai textile firms, see Eguchi, *Toshi shōburujōa*, p. 306.
55. Makamura Takafusa, 'Gaisetsu: 1937–1965 nen', in 'Keikakuka' to 'Minshuka', ed. Nakamura Takafusa. Iwanami shoten, 1989, p. 9.
56. Erik Olin Wright, *Classes*. London, Verso (New Left Books), 1985, p. 38.
57. For example Toyoda, *Sangyō kokusaku*, pp. 1–2, for the use of the term *hihei* (impoverishment, exhaustion) to describe the position of the 'old middle class' in a 'renovationist bureaucrats' work that explicitly looks at the withering away of this class. Also, Kikakuin kenkyūkai, *Kokubō kokka no kōryō*. Tokyo, Shin-kigen-sha, 1941, p. 28; Minoguchi, *Chūshō sangyō*, p. 106–107.

58. Eguchi, *Toshi shōburujōa*, pp. 8–10.
59. Nakamura, 'Gaisetsu,' p. 9.
60. Hara Akira gives a concise description of the economic control system in Manchuria in Hara Akira, '1930 nendai no Manshū keizai tōsei seisaku', in *Nihon teikoku shugi shita no Manshū*, ed. Manshū shi kenkyūkai. Ochanomizu shobō, 1972, p. 45. Enthusiasm for this on the part of intellectuals and renovationist bureaucrats is described in Furukawa Takahisa, 'Shōwa jūninen – jūyonnen no kikakuin', *Shigaku zasshi* 97/10, 1988, p. 56. Some of the many bureaucrats for whom Manchuria functioned as a combined laboratory and postgraduate course are noted in Kawahara Hiroshi, *Shōwa seiji shisō kenkyū*. Waseda Daigaku shuppan-bu, 1979, pp. 82–83.
61. Mori, *Saihensei*, pp. 78–79.
62. Oda Yoshitomo [?], *Yokusan undō to Konoie kō*. Tokyo shobō, 1940, p. 277.
63. *Rinsen taisei*, p. 89.
64. *Rinsen taisei*, p. 39.
65. Yamada Kō, *Sengo no shisōka-tachi*. Dōjika sha, 1985, p. 35.
66. Maruyama, *Thought and Behaviour*, pp. 57–58.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
68. Various critiques have pointed this out including Yoshimoto Takaaki. Lawrence Olson, 'Intellectuals and "The People": On Yoshimoto Takaki', *JFS* 4/2 1978, p. 343; and Nakajima Makoto, *Maruyama Masao ron*. Dai-san bunmei sha, 1982/1974, pp. 32, 56–57, 129.
69. Maruyama, *Thought and Behaviour*, p. 62.
70. Eguchi, *Toshi shōburujōa*, p. 432.
71. Eguchi, *Toshi shōburujōa*, pp. 448–449; 'Manshū jihen', *Rekishi hyōron* 377, September 1981, pp. 60–69.
72. This is documented in James B. Crowley, 'Intellectuals as Visionaries of the New Asian Order', in *Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan*, ed. James W. Morley. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 319–374.
73. Minoguchi Tokijirō, *Chūshō sangyō to rōmu mondai*, p. 261.
74. Toyoda Masataka, *Sangyō kokusaku to chūshō sangyō*, pp. 118–119.
75. A number of these for the early 1930s are discussed in Eguchi Keiichi, *Toshi shōburujōa undō shi no kenkyū*, p. 318ff.
76. For more exhortations in this vein, see Nakanishi Satoshi, *Taisei yokusan tokuhon*. Tosei shoin, 1940, pp. 91–94.
77. Hōchi shinbun-sha seijibu, *Shintaisei to wa dona koto ka*, ed. Matsuyama Koitsu. Naigai Shobō, 1940, p. 228.
78. *Rinsen taisei ka no shōgyōsha mondai*, pp. 241–252.
79. Bisson, *War Economy*, p. 70.
80. Expansion of bureaucratic power is documented in Johnson, *MITI*.
81. Shiota, 'Senji tōsei', p. 258.
82. Eguchi notes the fuzziness of the concept *chūshō burujōajii* as used in Japanese writing. Eguchi Keiichi, *Toshi shōburujōa undō shi no kenkyū*, pp. 18–19.
83. Nakamura Masanori, 'Kokka dokusen shihon shugi no seiritsu', in *Sensō to kokka dokusen shihon shugi*, ed. Nakamura Masanori. Nihon hyōron-sha, 1979, pp. 1–46.

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